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Violent Political Action during the European Economic Crisis: An 
Empirical Investigation of Four Theoretical Paradigms from 
Social Movement Research 
 
Abstract  
The recent economic crisis has witnessed a surge in demonstrations and other 
protest actions all over Europe, while in the most affected countries ± such as 
Greece ± the use of personal violence and damage of property became an everyday 
phenomenon. What are the drivers of violent political action in times of crisis? How 
do these drivers interact? And to what extent does context matter? These questions 
are examined in light of a new and original survey dataset carried out across nine 
European countries, all affected to different degrees by the financial crisis. Four 
theoretical paradigms from social movement research that account for violent 
political action are examined. This study looks beyond the staple explanations of 
relative deprivation and resource mobilisation, expands the analysis to include a 
relational approach ± namely, conflictual irrelevance ± and explores the soundness 
of an integrative approach that attempts to reconcile the traditional divide between 
grievance and resource-based models. By measuring actual behaviour rather than 
merely intention, the article furthermore contributes to the discussion over the 
participation of individuals in violent activism and gives empirical support to the 
dual pathways model of collective action for the understanding of violent political 
action during times of crisis.  
 
 
Keywords: violent political action, relative deprivation, resource mobilisation, 
conflictual irrelevance, dual pathways model 
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Introduction  
The literature on social movements and collective action has often associated the 
emergence of radical action repertoires with periods of social and economic turmoil 
(Buechler, 2004). According to this line of reasoning, the grievances that people 
develop when faced with deprivation and hardship fuel non-normative mobilisation 
and protest1 (Wright et al, 1990). Recently, grievances have resurfaced as central 
elements in the study of popular contention due to the economic crisis that began 
in 2007/08 (Giugni and Grasso, 2015; Kern et al, 2015; Grasso and Giugni, 2016; 
Grasso et al, 2017). High levels of protest activity have been observed, particularly 
in those countries worst hit by the crisis. In some countries such as Greece, an 
escalation of violence ± against both persons and objects ± has been noted (Rüdig 
and Karyotis, 2013; Karampampas, 2018). These observations suggest a seemingly 
straightforward theoretical link connecting the rising tide of protest and violence 
with popular, economic and political, grievances.  
However, a number of accounts have disputed the direct link between 
grievances and political action and pointed instead to different factors explaining 
the emergence of mobilisation and violence (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 
2013). In this paper we build on this previous work in order to disentangle the 
reasons that drive people to violent political action2 during times of politico-
                                                 
1
 Wright et al (1990) distinguished between normative and non-normative participation; the former 
includes all political actions that conform to the norms (e.g. laws and regulations) of a given society 
(e.g. voting, trade unions, peaceful protest) while the latter violates the dominant rules of the society 
(e.g. violence, property destruction, terrorism). 
2
 We understand violent political action as the episodic social interaction that immediately inflicts 
physical damage (light or severe) on objects, includes the threat and use of physical violence against 
persons and occurs as a by-product and/or in conjunction with non-violent protest (Diani, 2012; 
Seferiades and Johnston, 2002).  
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economic distress. In this way, the paper presents a comprehensive empirical test 
of the major theoretical approaches from the field of social movement research. Our 
analysis ± following 7LOO\¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQbehavioural, ideational and 
relational theories ± examines the explanatory power of relative deprivation theory, 
resource mobilisation theory and conflictual irrelevance theory, respectively. 
Additionally, through the consideration of an integrative perspective, which 
attempts to reconcile the split between those emphasising the importance of 
grievances and those that highlight the role of resources for the rise of non-
normative political action, this study further examines empirical evidence in 
support of the quotidian disruption WKH ³PRYHPHQWV RI FULVLV´ and the dual 
pathways models.  
To shed light on the micro and macro-level dynamics of this radical political 
phenomenon, we measure the actual participation of individuals in non-normative 
collective action using the data from an original survey dataset from nine European 
countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the UK) collected in the context of a collaborative research project in 2015 (N = 
18,000). [PROJECT DETAILS REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW]. The remainder 
of the paper proceeds as follows: first we review the existing literature and develop 
our theoretical hypotheses and we then discuss our data and methods in detail. Next, 
we present our results and finally we reflect on their implications with respect to 
wider theorising on political action. 
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Protest and Violent Political Action: Theories and Hypotheses 
The question is still open with respect to what factors lead to the adoption of violent 
tactics and a consensus has not yet been reached. Violent protest used to be 
classified into the same category with other forms of deviant and anomic behaviour 
such as crime and mental illness (Oberschall, 1980). The rise of political process 
theories (McAdam, 1982), along with the normalisation of protest in the 1970s and 
1980s (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Grasso, 2016), facilitated the demise of this 
perception and the development of an understanding of violence as a calculated and 
rational option (Tarrow, 1998). Later on, the profound influence of the contentious 
politics approach (McAdam et al, 2001) in the study of social movements led to the 
de-exceptionalisation of political violence as a sui generis phenomenon and to its 
reconceptualisation as an extension of protest tactics.  
In this paper, we start by testing three theories of collective action that 
represent different theoretical traditions for making sense of violent protest 
participation. Tilly (2003) distinguished between three different strands of 
understanding on collective violence. According to this, there are the behaviour 
people, who highlight the significance of emotions, impulses and passions; the idea 
people, who stress strategy, ideology and costs as the basis for mobilisation; and 
the relation people, who elevate the interactions between different actors, 
institutional and non-institutional, to the centre of the study of political violence. 
Three theories epitomise the above taxonomy: relative deprivation theory 
(behavioural/grievance-based theories), resource mobilisation theory 
(ideational/resource-based theories) and conflictual irrelevance theory (relational 
theories). We turn to each of these below.  
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Grievance-based theories: Relative deprivation  
According to the first account, grievances3 that DUH³WULJJHUHGE\VRPHEUHDNGRZQ
VWUDLQ RU GLVUXSWLRQ LQ QRUPDO VRFLDO URXWLQHV´ %XHFKOHU, 2004, p. 49) are the 
instigating cause of collective protest and violence. The most important variant of 
this theoretical tradition has been relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), which 
still has considerable impact in scientific research in social sciences (Smith and 
Pettigrew, 2015; Grasso et al, 2017).  
A central tenet of relative deprivation theory is the assertion that individuals 
who perceive that there is a gap between what they think they are entitled to and 
what they get or end up getting from a polity, tend to engage in political action to 
either reduce or eliminate this acknowledged gap. Particularly, as Gurr (1968) 
H[SODLQV ³RQH LQQDWH UHVSRQVH WR SHUFHLYHG GHSULYDWLRQ LV GLVFRQWHQW RU DQJHU´, 
which eventually acts as a catalyst for protest (p. 1104). This is the frustration-
aggression mechanism, which condenses WKH WKHRU\¶V position towards the 
emergHQFH RI FLYLO VWULIH DQG YLROHQFH DQG FDQ EH VXPPDULVHG LQWR D ³PRUH
JULHYDQFHEUHHGVPRUHSURWHVW´SHUFHSWLRQ0XOOHU, 1985). As such, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Greater anger is associated with an increased likelihood of 
violent political action; and  
Hypotheses 2 (H2): Higher levels of life satisfaction are associated with a 
decreased likelihood of violent political action. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Grievances are the material and ideational constituted claims of unfair treatment that may motivate 
individuals and groups to protest action (Simmons, 2014).  
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Resource-based theories: Resource mobilisation  
Resource-based or political process theories developed as a criticism of the 
dominance of the deprivation perspective during the 1960s. Political process 
scholars not only rejected the notion of protest as an emotional reaction to 
grievances, but fundamentally recognised grievances as a relatively constant feature 
of modern societies (Jenkins, 1983). What is more, they identified violent tactics as 
purposeful collective actions that claimants employ to defend or obtain collective 
goods (Oberschall, 1978). Variants of political process theories such as political 
opportunity theory (McAdam, 1982) as well as resource mobilisation theory 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977) can today be seen as part of the most dominant strand 
of theories for protest emergence.  
In particular, the resource mobilisation approach of social movement theory 
emphasises the importance of resources, organisational structures and political 
opportunities as necessary for individual and group mobilisation (McAdam et al, 
1996). According to this perspective, political action is a result of the availability 
of resources, rather than the absence of them ± as deprivation theorists argued. 
+RZHYHU LW LV WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ RI UHVRXUFHV ZLWK D VWDWH¶V SROLWLFDO RSSRUWXQLW\
structure that fuels or constrains mobilisation, as groups take advantage of political 
opportunities and respond to political threats in their attempt to advance and secure 
their interests (Della Porta, 1995). Hence, the theory regards the use of a violence 
as a strategic choice, a tactic that is pursued when the benefits of participation seem 
to outweigh its costs (Muller and Opp, 1986). Other factors that decrease the cost 
of political action are solidarity incentives, social networks and group identification 
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(Kitts 2000). Based on these key insights from the resource mobilisation approach 
of social movement theory, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Group membership is associated with an increased likelihood 
of violent political action; and  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Higher political interest is associated with an increased 
likelihood of violent political action. 
 
Relational theories: Conflictual irrelevance  
Grievance and resource-based approaches have been found wanting though, 
particularly with respect to those cases where either violence did not erupt despite 
the presence of root causes, or where violence remained low despite the existence 
of facilitating factors (Alimi et al, 2015). Inspired by the path-breaking analysis of 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), a new theoretical tradition developed, 
emphasising the dynamics by which the root causes exert their effect. This 
perspective underlines the importance of how and when the shift to violence occurs, 
by studying how different causal mechanisms interact to trigger the use of violent 
tactics (Bosi et al, 2014). Hence, a relational analysis pays attention to the 
³interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and 
FRQQHFWLWZLWKQRQYLROHQWSROLWLFV´7LOO\, 2003, p. 20). 
More specifically, Seferiades DQG-RKQVWRQ¶VFRQIOLFWXDO LUUHOHYDQFH
theory focuses on the interaction between claimants and the state to analyse the rise 
of violent political action. The two authors argue that the outbreak of violence is 
critically intertwined with the notion of conflict. Hence, while conflict is recognised 
as the interactive relationship between challengers and the state that entails the 
8 
 
making of interest-entailing claims, violence is seen as the exhaustion of this 
relationship. Conflictual irrelevance theory identifies two patterns for the rise of 
violent political action in present-day democracies. First, as a response to the 
disruptive deficit, when individuals that feel unrepresented by traditional 
challenging actors (e.g. trade unions, left-wing parties) join the ranks of 
transgressive organisations4 in order to make their claims heard (Diani, 2012). 
Second, as a retribution to the reform deficit characterising the contemporary 
neoliberal democracies, as claimants react to the reluctance of the state to respond 
to their demands (Goldstone, 2012). Consequently, when the two deficits ± reform 
and disruptive ± FRLQFLGHWKH\SURGXFHDSROLWLFDOYDFXXP³WKDWWHQGVWRSUHFLSLWDWH
YLROHQWDFWLRQ´6HIHULDGHVDQG-RKQVWRQ As such, we expect that:   
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Transgressive group membership is associated with an 
increased likelihood of violent political action; and 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Increased blame for government for the crisis is associated 
with an increased likelihood of violent political action. 
 
Reconciling paradigms: Quotidian disruption³movements of crisis´DQGGXDO
pathways model 
The long-lasting divergence between grievance and resource-based theories has 
produced a wide array of competing explanations for violent political action 
                                                 
4
 Transgressive organisations are those that employ an innovative repertoire of collective action, as 
they employ claims and tactics that are unprecedented, confrontational and even unauthorised within 
DSROLWLFDOUHJLPHȉLOO\*LOlham and Noakes, 2007). In contrast, constrained movements use 
an institutionalised or routinised tactical repertoire that respects the dominant norms of a given 
regime.  
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through the years. Nonetheless, a number of researchers have not only challenged 
this perceived dichotomy, but also proposed perspectives combining the two 
approaches. Snow et al (1998) theorised quotidian disruption as the sudden 
breakdown of everyday life occurring ZKHQ ³URXWLQLVHG SDWWHUQV RI DFWLRQ DUH
UHQGHUHG SUREOHPDWLF DQG WKH QDWXUDO DWWLWXGH LV IUDFWXUHG´ S  +RZHYHU
solidarity and social ties are also seen as central to the mobilisation process in 
addition to the suddenly imposed grievances given that despite the breakdown of 
routines, they remain strong and facilitate protest (Snow et al, 2005). Applying this 
scheme to the recent crisis, during which resources kept decreasing and claims 
increased, we can expect that when economic hardship disrupts everyday routines 
it becomes a quotidian disruption. Then, in line with the quotidian disruption thesis, 
we would expect that a combination of grievances and resources would act as a 
stimulus for the rise of protest and violence in times of crisis. Following this theory, 
we thus hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The effect of grievance indicators on violent political action 
will be greater when people also hold political resources.  
Moreover, the ³PRYHPHQWV RI FULVLV´ SHUVSHFWLYH also combines different 
approaches. Kerbo (1982) GLIIHUHQWLDWHG EHWZHHQ ³PRYHPHQWV RI FULVLV´ DQG
³PRYHPHQWVRIDIIOXHQFH´ and in her recent book Della Porta (2015) drew a clear 
line between anti-austerity/Occupy movements (movements of crisis) and the post-
PDWHULDOLVW³QHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV´ (movements of affluence). Fuelled by anger 
and grievances, then, anti-austerity movements are expected to be more violent than 
their post-materialist counterparts. According to this line of reasoning, then, we 
anticipate that: 
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Hypothesis 8 (H8): The countries most affected by the crisis will show the highest 
levels of violent political action relative to those less affected. 
Finally, the dual pathways model integrates the notions of grievances and 
resources. Based on the work of Lazarus (1991), who recognised collective action 
as a form of coping with collective disadvantage, Van Zomeren et al (2004) 
identified two pathways to protest: an emotion-focused pathway fuelled by anger 
and a sentiment of unfairness; and a problem-focused pathway stimulated by a cost-
benefit analysis and the belief that issues can be solved collectively. Hence, while 
the former is recognised as an emotional reaction of individuals towards a perceived 
illegitimate collective disadvantage, the latter is seen as a calculated deed that 
people undertake when they believe they have access to enough resources to 
successfully stand up for their claims (Tausch et al, 2011). By this logic then, people 
are drawn to protest as a result of either grievances or due to their resource-based 
confidence that they can resolve their troubles. We thus hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The effect of grievance and resource indicators on 
violent political action will be similar across the countries under examination.  
 
Data and Methods 
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on data from an original cross-national 
survey conducted in 2015 in the context of the [PROJECT NAME REMOVED 
FOR PEER REVIEW] project funded by the European Commission under the 
auspices of their 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement number REMOVED 
FOR PEER REVIEW). The survey was conducted in nine European countries 
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) 
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by a specialised polling agency (YouGov) with samples matched by quotas to 
national population statistics in terms of region, gender, age, and education level5.  
As noted above, we are interested in analysing which factors impact on 
violent political action. More specifically, we employ an indicator which asks 
respondents whether they had engaged in two forms of violent political action, by 
using personal violence (e.g. against the police) or by damaging property. We focus 
on those individuals who said that they had engaged in either or both of these acts 
in the last five years (i.e. during the recent economic crisis); thus, measuring directly 
actual protest behaviour rather than intention to protest (Van Zomeren et al, 2008). 
These questions represent a ³step-up´ from normative collective action to more 
violent forms of political engagement, which would often require breaking of the 
law. We combine the two indicators as only very small numbers of respondents 
carry out such violent political acts across the countries (between less than 1% to 
around 5.5%), which is in line with Della 3RUWD¶V  DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³WKH
normalisation of some forms of protest goes DORQJZLWKWKHVWLJPDWLVDWLRQ´S
of the more violent forms. We use Poisson models to try and better account for the 
small number of cases6. 
In order to capture each of the first three explanatory models discussed in our 
theoretical section, we employ two key independent variables per model, alongside 
interaction effects between the grievance and the resource indicators to detect their 
combined framework and check for the integrative perspective. Our first 
                                                 
5
 The survey included a total N of approximately 18,000 respondents with approximately 2,000 N 
per country.  
6
 For each country the percent engaging in one or more of these activities is as follows; France 
(4.66%), Germany (4.43%), Greece (4.58%), Italy (7.49%), Poland (7.20%), Spain (4.13%), Sweden 
(2.14%), Switzerland (5.07%) and the UK (1.07%).  
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independent variable for measuring relative deprivation (H1-H2) is anger (H1). 
Respondents were given a choice of emotions related to their current economic 
situation and asked to judge them on a scale of 0 ± 10 (0 feeling them not at all, 10 
feeling them very strongly). Secondly, we use a measure of life satisfaction that 
asked individuals how satisfied they were during the time of the survey with their 
life on a scale from 0-10 (0 feeling completely dissatisfied, 10 feeling completely 
satisfied) (H2). To capture the resource mobilisation approach (H3-H4) due to the 
significance that the theory attributes to organisational resources and social 
networks, we include a binary measure of whether the respondent claims to be an 
active member of at least one political organisation (H3). The choice of groups 
included human rights, civil rights, environmental, feminist, LGBTQ, peace/anti-
war, anti-racist/migrant solidarity and social solidarity groups/networks. To capture 
the notion of mobilisation and collective behaviour, active members were those 
who claimed to both belong to and also contribute towards an organisation (through 
volunteering or other unpaid work). Those who claimed only to belong to an 
organisation without any active contribution were deemed passive and coded along 
with non-members. Moreover, we measure political interest as a binary measure for 
those who are 
YHU\
 DQG µTXLWH¶ LQWHUHVWHG (H4). On the other hand, to test for 
conflictual irrelevance theory (H5-H6), we firstly use a measure of active 
membership in transgressive groups (H5). This was based on the distinction 
between normative constrained and non-normative transgressive organisations 
(Tilly, 2000; Gillham and Noakes, 2007). The transgressive group variable is a 
binary measure that accounts for active membership of respondents in Occupy or 
anti-cuts, anti-austerity-type movements and/or anti-capitalist and global justice 
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groups. In addition, we look at blaming the government for the crisis (H6) (0/1). To 
test for the quotidian disruption thesis (H7) we include an interaction between the 
relative deprivation and resource mobilisation variables. Finally, to test for the 
³PRYHPHQWVRIFULVLV´+DQGGXDOSDWKZD\V+WKHVHV we check for country 
differences.  
Across all the models we controlled for standard controls in political 
participation research (Grasso and Giugni, 2016) including: age, education, 
occupation, whether the individual is unemployed, interest in politics, political 
efficacy and left-right values (see Table 1 for details on all variables). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Results 
In this section we examine the evidence for and against our theoretically-driven 
hypotheses for making sense of violent political action during the economic crisis. 
Table 2 presents the results from six models: (1) a baseline model; (2) a model 
examining hypotheses H1-H6; (3)-(6) interaction models examining the multiple 
possible combinations of interest between grievance and mobilisation variables 
(H7). Our baseline model 1 presents two findings that remain robust across all the 
models. Those who have undertaken violent political action are more likely to be 
male (0.54, p<0.01), a pattern well-established in the literature (Schlozman et al, 
1999). They are also more likely to consider themselves on the political right 
(0.004, p<0.05). On the other hand, we do not find evidence for any influence from 
age, occupation, education and unemployment.  
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We then move to examining the evidence for and against H1 and H2 and test 
for grievance effects by looking at the effect of anger and life satisfaction on violent 
political action in Model 2. Results show that when it comes to the anger variable, 
those who report higher levels of anger are significantly more likely to have 
committed violent political acts (0.04, p<0.01). However, with respect to 
satisfaction with life we do not find an effect. Therefore, when it comes to relative 
deprivation, our results support the notion that anger an important driver for violent 
political behaviour. 
 
Table 2 and 3 here 
 
To test resource mobilisation theory, we examine H3 and H4 that hypothesise 
that those with an active group participation and those with higher levels of political 
interest are more likely to be involved in violent political action. Results show 
support for the effect of political interest ± those with higher levels of interest are 
more likely to act in this way in comparison to those with lower levels. Being a 
member of a political organisation also has a positive effect; hence, those who are 
active members are more likely than their non-member counterparts to have been 
involved in violent political action. Resource mobilisation is an important driver of 
participation in political violence. Therefore, evidence at this stage supports both 
grievance and resource mobilisation approaches. Whilst individuals have to be 
angry to carry out political violence, there is also evidence that this is not the only 
trigger. There is also clear evidence that active involvement in political groups also 
matters, providing initial support for the idea that this behaviour is not carried out 
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by individuals in isolation, but by individuals who are members of political 
organisations. 
In terms of H5-H6 and the conflictual irrelevance approach, results are more 
mixed. As hypothesised, membership in a transgressive group boosts the likelihood 
of these violent political acts (0.93, p<0.01), supporting the idea that transgressive 
organisations do matter. However, our hypothesis is not supported with respect to 
blaming the government.  
To explore H7 and the quotidian disruption thesis we interact the variables 
associated with relative deprivation and resource mobilisation in Models 3-6, 
including one interaction term only in each model. Evidence shows only one 
significant result but not in the direction hypothesised: a negative interaction 
between both anger and active group membership. This negative interaction 
suggests that higher levels of anger increase the likelihood of carrying out violent 
political acts for respondents who are not members of political groups; for those 
who are members, the relationship is, weakly, in the other direction. These results 
disprove the quotidian disruption thesis in this sense and show grievances are more 
relevant for those who are outside of organisations when it comes to mobilisation 
to violent political action. Despite the fact that the crisis disrupted the everyday life 
in the most affected countries, grievances and resources do not in this case combine 
to propel violence. 
The ³PRYHPHQWs RI FULVLV´ + DQG dual pathways approaches (H9) are 
examined by looking at the country differences. ,QWKHFDVHRIWKH³PRYHPHQWVRI
crisis,´ we turn to examining country differences in violent political action as 
outlined in reference to Greece in Table 2. Here we can see that protest patterns do 
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not match the severity of the crisis, as it would be expected by WKH³PRYHPHQWRI
WKHFULVLV´WKHVLV. Hence, while some countries ± such as Greece ± experienced deep 
crisis, they faced lower levels of violent protest than those with much weaker crisis 
like Poland. Actually, there are no differences between the likelihood for 
participation in violent political action for respondents in Greece, Germany and 
Spain ± countries with very different experiences of the crisis. At the same time, 
countries such as the UK have consistently lower levels in comparison to Greece, 
whilst Italy, Poland and France have consistently higher. A fact that challenges the 
clear-cut categorisation of movements in resource-rich and resource-poor and 
highlights the importance of the protest culture and the accepted repertoires of 
action for the manifestation of violent political action in each country.  
To examine the evidence for H9 we turn to Table 3 and examine the country-
specific models. Here we can see that on the whole the effects of grievance and 
resource indicators are similar across the nine countries of the survey. The above 
results also support those voices claiming that there is not a single universal 
pathway to protest participation, as citizens participating in collective action are not 
a homogenous entity but a heterogeneous mass with different characteristics 
(Vráblíková, 2015).  
The most important findings to emerge out of our analysis is the negative 
interaction between grievance and resource indicators, which thus supports the idea 
of the existence of two independent pathways to violent political action: an 
emotion-focused pathway stirred up from anger and a feeling of unfairness and a 
problem-focused pathway stimulated by the abundance of organisational and other 
17 
 
resources in the hands of claimants; providing therefore clear empirical evidence 
for the validity of the dual pathways thesis (H9) (Van Zomeren et al, 2012).  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper was the first attempt to investigate the relation between the recent 
economic crisis and the emergence of violent political action that was observed in 
some European countries. The nature and intensity of the protest during the crisis 
era gave prominence to a recurring debate in the study of collective action: the place 
of grievances and relative deprivation as an analytical tool for the analysis of violent 
political action. Next to relative deprivation, we examined two alternative theories 
that try to account for violent protest, the conflictual irrelevance and resource 
mobilisation approaches, as well as three different models of the integrative 
paradigm on collective action: TXRWLGLDQGLVUXSWLRQ³PRYHPHQWVRIFULVLV´DQGGXDO
pathways models. For that, we used an original cross-national survey conducted in 
2015 in the context of the [PROJECT NAME REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW], 
which was carried out in nine European countries ± all of them affected to a 
different extent by the crisis. 
Our findings confirm previous studies over the role of grievances in collective 
action, as individual-level feelings of relative deprivation have an impact on both 
normative (Kern et al, 2015; Giugni and Grasso, 2016) and non-normative 
mobilisation (Della Porta and Mattoni, 2014). The impact of grievances in 
motivating violent political action seems to intensify even further under negative 
economic circumstances, such as during the recent economic crisis. At the same 
time, the results corroborate previous studies over the consequence of pre-existing 
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networks and groups for non-normative and violent political participation (Nepstad 
and Smith, 1999). The strong effect of both grievance and resource indicators 
throughout the nine countries ± regardless of the level of the crisis ± on violent 
political action substantiates previous research over the closing of the protest gap 
between resource-poor and resource-rich individuals in negative economic contexts 
(Grasso et al, 2017). More importantly, this study provides clear empirical evidence 
for the validity of the dual pathways thesis and the co-existence of two distinct, an 
emotion-focused and a problem-focused, pathways to violent political action, 
further demonstrating a positive relation of non-normative forms of political action 
with both grievance (e.g. anger) and resource (e.g. group membership, political 
interest) indicators (Van Zomeren et al, 2004; Van Zomeren et al, 2012). The 
existence of two independent pathways to violent political action also challenges 
this literature that treats demonstrators as a homogenous entity driven through a 
single universal pathway to protest.  
Finally, the small number of cases suggests that the results and further 
analysis should be treated with caution. Further research is necessary in order to 
ascertain if the prominence of the dual pathways thesis in the study of violent 
political action is valid, as well as to investigate whether it can be generalised to 
other comparable settings.  
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Table 1: Variable Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Demographics     
Age 45.6 14.76 18 88 
Gender (Male) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Education (Less than upper secondary) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Occupation (Manual) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Unemployed 0.12 032 0 1 
Left-Right Scale (Left 0-10 Right) 4.90 2.65 0 10 
Grievance     
Anger (0-10 more anger.) 5.76 3.28 0 10 
Life satisfaction (0-10 more sat.) 6.00 2.34 0 10 
Resource Mobilisation     
Organisation member (Active member) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Political Interest (More interested) 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Conflictual irrelevance     
Trans. group members (Active member) 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Blame Government (Blame) 0.21 0.41 0 1 
n 13,531    
24 
 
Table 2: Poisson Regression Models and Interaction Tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age.Sq -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.54*** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.44*** 
 (0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Education (low) 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
 (0.092) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Occupation (manual) -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.088) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Unemployed -0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
Left-Right (0-10) 0.04** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Anger (0-10)  0.11** 0.18*** 0.01 0.11** 0.11** 
  (0.046) (0.067) (0.083) (0.047) (0.046) 
Life Sat. (0-10)  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.031) 
Org. Member  1.54*** 1.72*** 1.53*** 1.61*** 1.53*** 
  (0.076) (0.134) (0.076) (0.180) (0.076) 
High Pol. Interest  0.17** 0.17** 0.01 0.17** 0.09 
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.144) (0.085) (0.208) 
Transg. Org. Member  0.61*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Blame Government  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Country (ref=Greece)       
Germany  -0.05 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) 
France 0.34** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (0.156) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) 
Italy 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 
 (0.131) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Poland 0.45*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 
 (0.136) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
Spain -0.07 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
Sweden -0.48** -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.208) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) 
Switzerland 0.14 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
 (0.152) (0.158) (0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) 
UK -1.05*** -0.68** -0.66** -0.68** -0.68** -0.68** 
 (0.278) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) 
Interactions       
Org. Member*Anger   -0.14*    
   (0.078)    
Pol.Interest*Anger    0.12   
    (0.090)   
Org. Member *Life Sat.     -0.01  
     (0.027)  
Pol.Interest*Life.Sat      0.01 
      (0.034) 
Constant -1.53*** -3.36*** -3.49*** -3.24*** -3.40*** -3.30*** 
 (0.393) (0.409) (0.423) (0.419) (0.424) (0.432) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
N 13,531 13,531 13,531 13,531 13,531 13,531 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3: Country-specific Models 
 (Greece) (Germany) (France) (Italy) (Poland) (Spain) (Sweden) (Switz.) (UK) 
Age -0.05 0.07 0.08 -0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.21** 0.02 0.17 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.15) 
Age.Sq 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.84*** -0.46 -0.37 -0.09 -0.39* -0.48 -0.30 -0.48* -1.09 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) (0.40) (0.24) (0.61) 
Education (low) -0.12 0.35 -0.20 -0.13 0.24 0.07 0.53 0.31 0.36 
 (0.34) (0.30) (0.33) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.47) (0.27) (0.81) 
Occupation (manual) 0.19 -0.10 -0.26 0.02 0.11 0.40 0.43 -0.20 -15.61 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.32) (0.21) (0.20) (0.26) (0.40) (0.26) (1312.10) 
Unemployed -0.53 0.16 0.35 -0.41 -0.21 0.04 1.85*** 0.71* -16.23 
 (0.29) (0.53) (0.33) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.52) (0.34) (4374.45) 
Left-Right (0-10) -0.07 0.13* 0.05 0.06* 0.07* 0.08 0.15* 0.09 0.23* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12) 
Anger (0-10) -0.05 0.62*** 0.11 -0.24* 0.07 -0.27 0.15 0.50*** 0.11 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.12) (0.34) 
Life Sat. (0-10) 0.06 -0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.12) 
Org. Member 1.33*** 1.21*** 1.59*** 2.25*** 1.81*** 1.09*** 1.53*** 0.92*** 1.38 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.43) (0.27) (0.70) 
High Pol. Interest 0.32 -0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.73* 0.21 0.61* -0.34 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (0.19) (0.24) (0.30) (0.48) (0.28) (0.67) 
Transg. Org. Member 0.40 0.42 0.69* 0.52** 0.58* 0.10 1.17** 0.33 1.84* 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.30) (0.19) (0.23) (0.26) (0.45) (0.27) (0.73) 
Blame Government 0.34 -0.02 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 0.21 0.41 0.47 0.03 
 (0.24) (0.35) (0.30) (0.20) (0.21) (0.27) (0.52) (0.31) (0.62) 
Constant -1.78 -4.76*** -3.88** -2.88*** -3.17** -1.85 -0.52 -3.82*** -7.66* 
 (1.14) (1.35) (1.21) (0.83) (0.99) (1.30) (1.63) (1.16) (3.62) 
N 1683 1551 1435 1621 1478 1720 1237 1474 1332 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.30 
Log lik. -296.74 -232.76 -218.38 -358.97 -330.53 -273.28 -112.60 -279.58 -57.48 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
